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COMMENTS
The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Law of
Maritime Personal Injuries
There are three principle causes of action available to a sea-
man who suffers personal injury: maintenance and cure,' unsea-
worthiness, and the Jones Act.2 The purpose of this Comment is
1. Maintenance and cure is available under the general maritime law. It is a
relational duty, incident to the seaman's status, sounding in neither tort nor con-
tract. It is composed of three elements: wages, maintenance, and cure. The in-jured seaman is entitled to his salary, earned and unearned, for the period of
time coincident with the length of the voyage. The seaman is entitled to the food
and lodging that he ordinarily would have received had he remained aboard the
vessel. Cure means that the owner must provide medical treatment until there is
full recovery, or, as in the case of an incurable injury or disease, until further
medical aid is unable to improve the condition. See GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW
OF ADMIRALTY 253-71 (1957) ; ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 291-301 (1939); Comments, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 489 (1952), 57
YALE L.J. 243 (1947).
2. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). Under the Jones Act a
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to analyze pertinent developments in the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness. The foundation case for the modern conception of
unseaworthiness is Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.8 Since that de-
cision the United States Supreme Court has determined the fol-
lowing to be the classic statement of that doctrine: a shipowner
has an absolute duty to furnish his seamen with a vessel and its
appurtenances which are reasonably fit for their intended use.4
This Comment will undertake an exploration of each of the ele-
ments of this duty.
SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNSEAWORTHINESS
The purpose of this section is to determine to what objects
the doctrine of unseaworthiness applies and to what persons the
duty is owed.
What Is a Vessel?5
The word vessel designates a particular physical environ-
ment, and so whether or not an object is considered a vessel de-
pends on the context in which the question is raised. During its
period of construction a ship is generally not considered a vessel.
It acquires that status only after it is launched." Even though an
object is on navigable waters, it will not be classified a vessel
seaman may recover compensatory damages for injury caused by the negligence
of the shipowner or his employees. See GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF AD-
MIRALTY 279-315 (1957); ROBINSON, HANDBOOK or ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 309-40 (1939).
3. 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The Mahnich decision resolved a conflict among the
lower courts as to whether unseaworthiness was liability without fault or liability
based on personal negligence. The majority view prior to Mahnich apparently
was to the effect that the shipowner's liability for an unseaworthy vessel or
appurtenance was based on personal negligence. The Tawmie, 80 F.2d 792 (5th
Cir. 1936); The Cricket, 71 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1934) ; Christopher v. Grueby,
40 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1930) ; The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (9th Cir. 1924) ; Henry
Gillen's Sons Lighterage v. Fernald, 294 Fed. 520 (2d Cir. 1923) ; Kahyis v.
Arundel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 492 (D. Md. 1933) ; The Birkenhead, 51 F.2d 116
(E.D. Pa. 1930) ; The Navarino, 7 F.2d 743 (E.D. N.Y. 1925). The minority
view seemed to be that liability for unseaworthiness was liability without fault.
The Seeandbee, 102 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1939) ; The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d
708 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Sabine Towing Co. v. Brenan, 71 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1934)
(overruled by The Tawmie, supra).; The Alpha, 44 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa.
1942).
4. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960) ; Mitchell V.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) ; Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steam-
ship Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953).
5. For a short discussion of what is a vessel for unseaworthiness purposes, see
NORIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 126-29 (1959).
6. Peters, What Is a "Vessel" in the Admiralty Law?, 6 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL
L. REV. 139 (1957) ; ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 42-54 (1939).
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unless it possesses a certain physical structure. In making this
determination each case must turn on its own facts. Thus, a raft
of logs, 7 a float," a barge without a sail or rudder,9 and a float-
ing pontoon1 0 have been classified vessels. But floating cranes11
and floating drydocks12 have not been given that status.13 How-
ever, it must be noted that in none of the cases abovementioned
was the court dealing with questions of unseaworthiness. But,
there would seem to be no rational basis for making a distinction
between the rules determining when an object becomes a vessel
during its construction or what requisite physical structure it
must have in the above instances and the same determinations
for unseaworthiness purposes.
In a third situation an object may very clearly be a ship, but
its status in doubt because of its surroundings, purpose, and
manner of use, the doubt arising in the factual situations of dry-
docking, major reconstruction, non-usage, de-activation, re-
building or conversion. 4 Under these conditions, the courts have
7. Muntz v. A Raft of Timber, 15 Fed. 555 (E.D. La. 1883) ; United States
v. One Raft of Timber, 13 Fed. 796 (S.C. Cir. 1882).
8. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
9. Disbrow v. The Walsh Brothers, 36 Fed. 607 (S.D. N.Y. 1888).
10. The Mackinaw, 165 Fed. 351 (D. Ore. 1908).
11. See citation in Peters, What I8 a "Vessel" in the Admiralty Law?, 6
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 144, n. 24 (1957).
12. The Warfield, 120 Fed. 847 (E.D. N.Y. 1903).
13. For collections of cases determining what physical structure constitutes a
vessel, see Peters, What Is a "Vessel" in the Admiralty Law?, 6 CLEVELAND-MA.R-
SHA LL L. REV. 139 (1957) ; 44 WORDS AND PHRASES 148 (1940) ; 2 C.J.S., Ad-
miralty § 18 (1936).
14. It is in this type of factual situation that the question of what is a vessel
most often arises. However, in this context, there has been a marked absence
of cases deciding what is a vessel for the purposes of unseaworthiness. This is
perhaps attributable to the impact which those cases dealing with the question
of who are seamen had on the theory and development of the doctrine. In most
instances where the issue of what was a vessel arose, the issue of who was a sea-
man was factually interrelated. However, since the decisions delineating seamen
were well known to the bench and bar, seemingly every attempt was made to dis-
pose of each case on the issue of who is a seaman. In some instances it was much
more apparent that the object was not a vessel than that the person was not a
seaman. Several courts adopted a rather novel and obtuse approach to this prob-
lem by finding that the person could not benefit from the doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness because he was not a seaman since the ship was not a vessel. Union Carbide
Corp. v. Goett, 256 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Berge v. National Bulk Carriers
Corp., 251 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Line, 238 F.2d
385 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Lyon v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. N.Y. 1958).
An example of such a case is Raidy v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md.
1957), affd per curiam, 252 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1958). There it was said that
the injured person was performing duties not within the competence of the tradi-
tional or customary activities of the crew. However, the nature of Raidy's work
was never really discussed. Instead, it was found that the ship was in drydock
and not subject to the perils of navigation; that the work being done aboard could
not be performed by the crew; and that the owner had no control of the work
being done or of the ship. It would seem that the above findings would not have
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generally applied two different tests. Title 1, Section 3, of the
United States Code of 1958 defines a vessel as "every description
of water craft or other artificial contrivance used or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation on water." This defi-
nition has been utilized to determine the scope of coverage of an
insurance policy15 and to determine whether a maritime lien for
repairs applied to an object.16 However, it has been said that in
order for the admiralty court to obtain jurisdiction over a repair
lien17 or for the purposes of the Jones Act' s and the Great Lakes
Jury Statute 9 the ship must be in navigation to be considered a
vessel. What is in navigation is a question of fact. A ship is no
longer in navigation when it is put away for the winter,20 or is
used solely as a floating warehouse, 21 or is on blocks on land.22
If there is no present hope or intention of a vessel going to sea
or if it would take a long time to put the vessel in shape to make
a voyage, then it is not in navigation.23 However, if a ship is in
dry-dock being repaired in order to make another voyage, or is
idle and awaiting repairs it is considered as still in navigation. 24
In West v. United States25 it would seem that the Supreme
Court propounded a third test, separate and distinct from the
other two, for determining what is a vessel for unseaworthiness
purposes in a similar factual context.26 West was injured aboard
the Mary Austin, a vessel owned by the United States, which
had been in the "moth-ball" fleet but was being re-activated.2 7
relevance to the issue of whether Raidy was a seaman, but, as will be seen, seem
to be very significant in determining whether a ship is a vessel.
15. Trinidad Corp. v. American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & In-
demnity Ass'n, 229 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956).
16. Campbell v. Loznicka, 181 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1950).
17. Hercules Co. v. The Brigadier General Absolom Baird, 214 F.2d 66 (3d
Cir. 1954).
18. Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952) ; Carumbo v. Cape
Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941).
19. Krolczyk v. Waterways Navigation Co., 151 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Mich.
1957).
20. Seneca Washed Gravel Corp. v. McManigal, 65 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1933)
Gonzales v. United States Shipping Board, Emergency Fleet Corp., 3 F.2d 168
(E.D.N.Y. 1924).
21. Hawn v. American S.S. Co., 107 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1939); Krolczyk v.
Waterways Navigation Co., 151 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
22. Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952).
23. Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941).
24. Hawn v. American S.S. Co., 107 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Hunt v. United
States, 17 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. N.Y. 1936), aff'd per curiam, 91 F.2d 1014 (2d
Cir. 1937).
25. 361 U.S. 118 (1959).
26. We8t seems to be the first case under the modern doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness to focus attention on the meaning of the term vessel.
27. The Court expressly stated that the decision pivoted not on whether West
was a seaman, but on whether the object was a vessel for unseaworthiness pur-
poses. West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118, 122 (1959).
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Three factors were considered in determining the status of the
Mary Austin: (1) Who had control of the vessel? (2) Were the
members of the crew aboard and performing their usual tasks?
(3) What was the nature, magnitude, and pattern of the work
to be done? It was found that the complete control of the ship
and the repairing was in the contractor, that the only persons
representing the United States aboard the ship at any time were
not crewmen but inspectors, that the work involved was a com-
plete overhaul and reactivation, and that in order to accomplish
this work special equipment had to be employed. Because of
these factual findings the Court held that the ship was not a
vessel for unseaworthiness purposes.
Subsequently in Lawlor v. Soeony-Vacuum Oil Co. 28 it was
expressly held that the in navigation test was not appropriate
for defining the term vessel,29 and that the mere presence of
the ship on navigable waters was not determinative of its status.
The same three questions posed by the Supreme Court in West
were applied to determine whether the object was a vessel. It
was found that the repairs to be made were "only a large number
of relatively small miscellaneous items . . . generally included
in an annual overhaul, ' ' 30 that the crew of the ship were still
aboard performing their usual tasks, and that the principal
control of the vessel was in the hands of the shipowner. It was
therefore held that the object was a vessel for unseaworthiness
purposes. The analytical approach utilized in both West and
Lawlor has also been adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.31
As to where the final line will be drawn between West, where
all three questions of analysis were resolved in favor of the
object not being a vessel, and Lawlor, where all three determina-
tions were resolved in favor of the object being a vessel, only
time and litigation will tell. It is only speculative whether the
test used in West will be extended to apply in areas other than
unseaworthiness. However, it might be suggested that deter-
mining what is a vessel would be greatly facilitated if only one
test were appropriate in all instances where the object's status
28. 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1960). The court here conceded that the plaintiff
was performing work traditionally done by members of the crew when he was
injured.
29. Id. at 602: "Moreover, we do not think resort to a mere phrase such as
'out of navigation' gets us very far."
30. Id. at 604.
31. Noel v. Isbrandtsen Co., 287 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Roper v. United
States, 282 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 81 Sup. Ct. 466 (1961).
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is in doubt because of its surroundings, purpose, and manner
of use.
What Is an Appurtenance of the Vessel?
Just as the shipowner warrants8 2 the seaworthiness of the
hull of the vessel, so also does he warrant the reasonable fitness
of at least some of the gear and appliances aboard the vessel.
Seamen also are considered appurtenances for the purposes of
unseaworthiness.- It is not necessary that the appurtenance
be owned or controlled by the shipowner, nor must it be an
actual part of the vessel. It has been held that equipment owned,
brought aboard, and controlled by third persons is covered by
the doctrine of unseaworthiness. 84 It is not even necessary that
the appurtenance be common or "ship-type" equipment."5 How-
ever, it is essential that the appurtenance be physically present
aboard the vessel, for it has been held that appurtenances on
shore are not subject to the warranty of seaworthiness, even
though they are used to further the ship's purpose.86
The courts have not as yet established a complete formula
for determining what objects aboard a vessel will be considered
appurtenances. Where the items are clearly being used to aid in
the operation of the vessel, such as a ship's winch, 7 rope,88
32. The word warrants is not here used in its traditional sense. For a time
it was generally thought that the duty of the shipowner to furnish a seaworthy
vessel was implied in the crew member's contract. The duty was thus contractual
and not delictual. See HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW 205 (1920);
Smith, Liability in the Admiralty for Injuries to Seamen, 19 HARV. L. REV. 418
(1906). Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) refuted the idea that
the duty was contractual and declared that it was delictual in nature.
33. Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., 348 U.S. 336, 340 (1955): "We
see no reason to draw a line between the ship and the gear on the one hand and
the ship's personnel on the other. A seaman with a proclivity for assaulting people
may, indeed, be a more deadly risk than a rope with a weak strand or a hull with
a latent defect."
34. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; Fox v. The S.S. More-
macwind, 285 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d
478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
35. Fox v. The S.S. Moremacwind, 285 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1960) (portable
power saw brought ofi board by carpenter) ; Considine v. Black Diamond Steam-
ship Corp., 163 F. Supp. 109 (D. Mass. 1958) (a chisel-truck used in unloading
certain cargo not owned by the ship, but brought on board by a stevedoring com-
pany).
36. Kent v. Shell Oil Co., 286 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Fredericks v. Ameri-
can Export Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955) (skid for unloading located
on a pier adjacent to the ship) ; Cockrell v. A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc.,
192 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Tex. 1961) ; McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd.,
181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (crane used by contractor not physically
attached to the ship).
37. Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Cook v. The M. V.
Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960); Weigel v. The M. V. Belgrano, 189
F. Supp. 103 (D. Ore. 1960).
38. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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shackle"9 or ladder,40 the courts have had little problem in find-
ing them to be appurtenances. However, that this is intended
to be the controlling factual determination is far from clear.
There are decisions which hold that cargo is an appurtenance
for the application of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. 41 How-
ever, it would seem that cargo does not aid in the performance
of the ship's mission; rather the carriage and delivery of cargo
is the ship's mission. It might well be urged that the cargo cases
stand for the proposition that an appurtenance for the purposes
of unseaworthiness is any object that is physically present
aboard the vessel. If this is all that is necessary to classify an
object as an appurtenance, it would seem that the duty resting
on a shipowner would be unduly burdensome. Thus, if a seaman
were shocked by a short-circuited radio belonging to a fellow
seaman, there would be recovery. Conceivably, if a homicidal
maniac wandered aboard a vessel and injured a seaman the
owner would have to indemnify. Even if the extension of the
unseaworthiness doctrine to objects not used in aid of the opera-
tion of the vessel is limited only to cargo, the owner would have
39. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
40. Pedersen v. United States, 224 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1955).
41. In Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958), the court indicated that the owner would be re-
sponsible for the unseaworthiness of cargo aboard his vessel. However, in Cara-
bellese v. Naviera Aznar, S.A., 285 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 81 Sup.
Ct. 907 (1961) and McMahan v. The Panamolga, 127 F. Supp. 659 (D. Md.
1955), it was indicated that the shipowner could not be held for the unsea-
worthiness of cargo. That improper stowage of cargo is an element of seaworthi-
ness has been affirmed by the following decisions: W. J. Jones & Sons, Inc. v.
Calmar Steamship Corp., 284 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Morales v. City of Galves-
ton, 275 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.), judgment vacated and remanded per curiam, 364
U.S. 295 (1960) ; Gindville v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 224 F.2d 746
(3d Cir. 1955) ; Amador v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 224 F.2d 437 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 901 (1955) ; Palazzola v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Knox v. United States Lines Co., 186 F. Supp. 668(E.D. Pa. 1960) ; Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va.
1960) ; Robillard v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). In
these cases, although the cargo was inherently safe and sound, an unsafe condition
was caused by the improper placement of the individual elements of cargo. Since
it is the shipowner's duty to furnish his seamen with a vessel and its appurte-
nances that are reasonably fit for their intended use, it would seem that the
courts in these decisions must consider cargo an appurtenance. Perhaps these
decisions will not stand if the question of whether or not cargo is to be considered
an appurtenance is more dramatically brought to issue where the injury is caused
by an actual defect in the cargo. It is curious to note, however, that the cases
which hold that the warranty of seaworthiness does not apply to cargo do hold
that proper stowage is an element of seaworthiness. Whether cargo is to be con-
sidered an appurtenance has never directly been before the Supreme Court. In
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), the
original plaintiff, Palazzolo, was injured by a dangerous condition created by the
improper stowage of cargo. However, the issues of whether cargo can be considered
an appurtenance or whether the doctrine of unseaworthiness only applied to those
objects aboard the vessel which aid in its operation were not before the court.
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a large responsibility, at least with respect to luxury vessels,
where the cargo consists of passengers, luggage, and pets.42
Who Is a Seaman?4 3
Originally, it was held that the doctrine of unseaworthiness
was available only to members of the ship's crew who had signed
the ship's articles.44 However, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki45
the class to whom the duty was owed was expanded to include
those persons who performed work or duties traditionally done
by members of the ship's crew. The policy consideration for this
extension is that persons performing this type of work are sub-
ject to the same hazards and dangers as members of the crew
and, therefore, should receive the same degree of protection.4
Thus, longshoremen, stevedores,4 7 and carpenters 48  have been
considered seamen while they were working on a vessel. 49 In the
lower federal courts those who have been classified as seamen
include tank and boiler cleaners,"" employees of the shipper, 51
and an Army officer assisting in loading operations. 52 Those
performing work found not to be traditionally done by members
of the crew have been marine painters,53 shipyard riggers,5 4
42. Thus, if a seaman were bitten by a passenger's pet that were found not
to be reasonably fit, seemingly there would be liability.
43. It is important that a plaintiff or libelant in an admiralty suit be classi-
fied as a "seaman." If he is a seaman, then all he need prove to recover indemnity
is that the vessel or appurtenance which caused his injury was not reasonably fit
for its intended use. If he is not considered a seaman, then the shipowner only
owes him a duty of reasonable care. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). If the injured person is considered a seaman
for the purposes of unseaworthiness, but is not a member of the ship's crew, the
shipowner also owes him a duty to provide a safe place in which to work. This is
the same duty that is owed to the common law business visitor. See NORRIS, MARI-
TIME PERSONAL INJURIES 91, n.2 (1959).
44. The Howell, 273 Fed. 513 (2d Cir. 1921) ; Weldon v. United States, 9 F.
Supp. 347 (D. Mass. 1934) ; The Mercier, 5 F. Supp. 511 (D. Ore. 1933), afj'd
per curiam, 72 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1934) ; The Concord, 58 Fed. 913 (S.D. N.Y.
1893) ; The Dago, 31 Fed. 574 (E.D. La. 1887).
45. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). This enunciation has been followed by United New
York & N.J.S.H.P. Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959) ; Crumady v. The
Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959) ; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406 (1953).
46. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 93, 99 (1946).
47. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959) ; Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
48. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
49. A person cleaning the ship's generators with carbon tetrachloride has been
found not to be doing work traditionally done by crewmen. United New York &
N.J.S.H.P. Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
50. Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953).
51. Bochantin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 96 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
52. Caudill v. Victory Carriers, 149 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1957).
53. Santiago v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
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firemen,55 bread salesmen,56 and "custom inspectors, inspectors
aboard vessels for the purpose of making recommendations for
repairs or improvements, and other shoreside specialists whose
sole duty it is to survey and inspect." 57 The Supreme Court has
yet to set a definite standard for determining what is work
traditionally done by the crew. Each case seemingly must stand
on its own findings of fact.58
It has been suggested that a "common-sense application of
the unseaworthiness rule should call for its extension to all those
who perform services on behalf of the vessel and who are de-
pendent on a reasonably safe, sound and seaworthy ship. 9
(Emphasis added.) This suggestion has special merit in that
such an approach would eliminate the confusion inherent in
attempting to determine the limits of the present test and also
is in accord with the basic policy considerations behind extend-
ing protection to non-members of the ship's crew.
It should be noted that once a person is considered a seamen
under the doctrine, his status is not lost by being ashore, if the
cause of his injury was an unseaworthy condition that existed
aboard the vessel.6 Thus, if unseaworthy tackle aboard the ship
breaks and falls upon a seaman who is standing on a dock, re-
covery will be allowed.61
RISKS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF UNSEAWORTHINESS
Under the original doctrine of unseaworthiness the ship-
owner only had to use reasonable care to provide a seaworthy
vessel.6 2 A plaintiff had to show two faults to obtain recovery:
54. Filipek v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 258 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1958).
55. McDaniel v. The M/S Lisholt, 282 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1960).
56. Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1955).
57. Royston v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 450, 451 (N.D.
Cal. 1960).
58. For other discussions of who are seamen for unseaworthiness purposes see
the following sources: NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 113-26 (1959);
Annot., 3 L. Ed. 2d 1764 (1959) ; Note, 13 MIAMI L. REV. 465 (1959) ; Comment,
N.Y.U.L. REV. 173 (1957).
59. NoRRis, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 115, n.4 (1959).
60. 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. 740 (1958) : "The admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage
or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwith-
standing that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." See Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Cordray, 258 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Strika v. Netherlands
Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Robillard v. A. L. Burbank &
Co., 186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
61. Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950).
62. For a discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of unsea-
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the personal fault of the owner and the fault of the vessel.
The Supreme Court, however, has removed the requirement of
proving fault on the part of the shipowner, and made his duty
to provide a seaworthy vessel absolute. In theory absolute or
strict liability is liability without personal fault.63 Yet the term
absolute liability 4 does not mean that the shipowner is an
insurer as to all risks incident to the activity in which he is
engaged, but merely means that in certain instances he will
have to indemnify for injuries regardless of his own personal
negligence. Deciding what risks are included within the ambit
of protection of any given duty is the "proximate cause" deter-
mination. Whether the particular duty involved be based on
negligence or is absolute, in either case, the courts must deter-
mine if the rule was designed to protect against the risk which
caused the injury. A decision of this nature is generally based
solely on policy considerations. Incident to this policy determi-
nation, the courts have evolved as the essence of the duty im-
posed on the shipowner under the unseaworthiness doctrine the
requirement that the vessel be reasonably fit for its intended
use.
What Is Reasonable Fitness?
A shipowner complies with his duty to supply seaworthy
equipment when it is reasonably safe and proper for its intended
purpose. As in the determination of liability for personal negli-
gence in general tort law,65 the standard of reasonableness in
worthiness see Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Work-
ers, 39 CORN. L.Q. 381 (1954). See also Note, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 496
(1961).
63. PROSSER, TORTS 315 (2d ed. 1955).
64. Ibid.; The Il. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1937) ("A ship is
an instrumentality full of internal hazards aggravated, if not created,, by the uses
to which she is put. It seems to us that everything is to be said for holding her
absolutely liable to her crew for injuries arising from defects in her hull and
equipment. The liability can be covered by insurance and is better treated as
an expense of the business than one left to an uncertain determination of courts
in actions to recover for negligence."). See also Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, 93 (1946).
65. Determining whether there is liability for unseaworthiness is strikingly
analogous to finding liability for personal negligence. Instead of the shipowner
being required to conform to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, the
vessel and its appurtenances must conform to a standard of quality or excellence,
i.e., reasonable fitness. As in a determination of liability for negligence, if the
vessel or appurtenance does not conform to the standard, liability is a consequence.
If the suit alleging unseaworthiness is brought on the common law side of the
federal court, then the duty of determining the standard of quality to be applied
in each case is, as in negligence cases, a finding of fact devolving upon the jury.
"Conceivably, seaworthiness could be a law question, as where a vessel, denied a
certificate of inspection by the Coast Guard because of defective conditions never-
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the unseaworthiness area is somewhat nebulous. 66 In many cases,
the custom of the trade, community, or industry has been vital
in determining whether a vessel or appurtenance has met the
required standard.6 7 However, as in the personal negligence
determination, conformity with the community standard creates
only an inference of reasonableness, which may be rebutted by
a finding that the standard exposes those protected by the duty
to unreasonable risks.68 Where there is no evidence of a custom
in the industry or community of shipowners, the reasonable
fitness determination rests upon whether the condition of the
vessel or appurtenance creates an unreasonable risk to seamen.
Reasonable fitness of the vessel in general. Even though the
vessel and its appurtenances are otherwise inherently safe and
sound, an unseaworthy condition may be created by the place-
ment, positioning or arrangement of the vessel's component
parts or appurtenances. Thus, a ship's deck will be made un-
seaworthy if an ordinarily seaworthy pad-eye is placed in the
center of a walkway commonly used by seamen.69 The position
theless sailed illegally and the injury complained of was proximately caused by
the defective condition." NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 107 (1959). The
burden of proving a case falls on the plaintiff in cases involving unseaworthiness.
Id. at 77-78, and the cases cited id. at 78, n.13.
66. It has been said that the "seaworthiness of a ship, her equipment and
appurtenance is a relative concept, dependent in each instance on the circumstances
in which her fitness is drawn in question" (Ross v. Steamship Zeeland, 240 F.2d
820, 822 (4th Cir. 1957)) and that " 'seaworthiness' is another of those terms in
the law which by reason of its appearance in different contexts has developed an
elusiveness making impossible an omnisufficient definition." (Mesle v. Kea Steam-
ship Corp., 260 F.2d 747, 750 (3d Cir. 1958)) These statements are true be-
cause of the appearance of the words "reasonably fit" in the phrasing of the duty
of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel. Because of these words, the ship-
owner is not held to a standard of perfection and made an insurer against any and
all injury occasioned aboard the vessel; nor is he obliged to furnish the best, most
modern and most convenient appliances or machinery. Doucette v. Vincent, 194
F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952).
67. Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Myers
v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1960); Bloomquist v. T. J. Mc-
Carthy Steamship Co., 263 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1959) Mesle v. Kea Steamship
Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959) ; Phipps v. N.
V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Stoomvart, Masts, 259 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1958) ;
Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955); Bentley v. Albatross
S.S. Co., 203 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st
Cir. 1952) ; Bonnewell v. United States, 170 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1948) ; McBrien
v. United States Petroleum Carrier's Inc., 177 F. Supp. 627 (S.D. N.Y. 1959);
DeVan v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 167 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1958) ; Bradshaw
v. The Carol Ann, 163 F. Supp. 366 (S.D. Tex. 1956) ; Haycraft v. The Java Sea,
143 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
68. Hanson v. Reiss Steamship Co., 184 F. Supp. 545 (D. Del. 1960) ; Casbon
v. Stockard Steamship Corp., 173 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1959).
69. Bonnewell v. United States, 170 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1948) for other ex-
amples see Osnovitz v. United States, 204 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1953) Rodriguez v.
The Angelina, 177 F. Supp. 242 (D. Puerto Rico 1959) ; Haycraft v. The Java
Sea, 143 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Ky. 1956) ; Henry v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 134
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of the pad-eye in relation to the physical plan of the vessel
creates an unreasonable risk. Most cases in this area have arisen
from accidents occurring during the discharge of cargo. Where
the cargo, though originally stowed properly, becomes unsafe
and dangerous due to its positioning, liability for unseaworthi-
ness has been imposed.70
Failure of a shipowner to provide a necessary appurtenance.
A vessel may be unseaworthy if it does not have the necessary
appurtenances aboard to carry out its intended purpose.' The
owner should know or anticipate what activities take place
aboard his vessel, and his failure to provide proper equipment
to perform these tasks and thus minimize hazards generally
creates an unreasonable risk for seamen. Custom plays an im-
portant part in deciding whether the vessel was reasonably fit
in not having a particular appurtenance aboard.7 2 Another im-
portant factor to consider in this area is the seriousness of the
risk involved. Thus, the risk is too great to permit an owner to
escape liability where he fails to provide life saving equipment.73
But, a hatch without a cover is not necessarily unseaworthy if
it is surrounded by a combing and there is a safe means of
passage around it.74
Fitness of furnished appurtenances. Where the failure of a
furnished appurtenance is dramatically obvious, as for example
where a piece of equipment breaks, 75 the inference of unsea-
worthiness is quite strong. Seemingly, the mere fact that the
failure occurs is sufficient evidence to support a finding of un-
F. Supp. 71 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) ; Ladjimi v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 97 F.
Supp. 174 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
70. See the cases cited in note 41 8upra.
71. Myers v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1960); Mesle v.
Kea Steamship Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966
(1959) ; Brown v. Dravo Corp., 258 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 960 (1959); Lester v. United States, 234 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
granted, 352 U.S. 889, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 983 (1957) ; Poignant v. United
States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Bentley v. Albatross S.S. Co., 203 F.2d 270
(3d Cir. 1953) ; McBrien v. United States Petroleum Carrier's Inc., 177 F. Supp.
627 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); Adams v. The UBL 118, 154 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. La.
1957) ; Bochantin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 96 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Mo. 1951);
Landgraf v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
72. This is demonstrated in Mesle v. Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959), wherein it was held that since it was the
custom of the industry to toe-nail shores, and since the failure to toe-nail was
the cause of the injury, the vessel was unseaworthy and the shipowner was liable.
73. Bochantin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 96 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
74. Adams v. The UBL 118, 154 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. La. 1957).
75. See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) ; Green v. Orion Shipping and Trad-
ing Co., 139 F. Supp. 431 (D. Md. 1956).
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seaworthiness. 76 It is with respect to this type of appurtenance
failure that the shipowner's liability most closely approximates
that of an insurer. Even if the appurtenance fails because of a
latent defect, the owner cannot be absolved, since absence of
personal fault is not a relevant consideration.77
In those cases dealing with the mere inadequacy of an ap-
purtenance to accomplish the purpose for which furnished, the
inference of unseaworthiness is by no means as great. Here,
resort will often be made to a balancing process, with pertinent
considerations being the custom of the industry, the probability
of injury, and the seriousness of the risk. Thus, liability may be
found where a hawser is too heavy for use as a dock line78 or a
cargo hook is improper for handling certain cargo.79 But where
a seaman is injured simply because a rug slipped80 or a winch
worked stiffly,8' no unseaworthiness has been found.
Fitness of seamen. Since a seaman is considered to be an
appurtenance for the purposes of the doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness,82 he also must conform to a standard of reasonable fitness.
The standard as enunciated requires the seaman to be equal in
disposition and seamanship to the ordinary man in the calling.8
With respect to disposition, it has been held that a seaman who
strikes another with a bottle8 4 or a cleaver,85 or who is known to
beat other seamen savagely,86 has dangerous and vicious pro-
pensities and is not reasonably fit. A seaman who merely en-
gages in a fist fight is not an unseaworthy appurtenance, on
the theory that members of the community of seamen are more
prone to violence than other persons. 87 Although there has been
76. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960) ; Thorson v. In-
land Navigation Co., 270 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co.,
205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Williams
v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 132 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. La. 1955). Only one case
was found in which it was indicated that the failure of the appurtenance alone
would not support a finding of unseaworthiness. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d
834 (1st Cir. 1952).
77. Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curi m, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
78. Walsh v. Boston Sand & Gravel Co., 175 F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass. 1959).
79. DeVan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
80. Hall v. American Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1958)
81. Ivusich v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 65 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. N.Y. 1945).
82. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S 336 (1955).
83. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952).
84. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
85. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952).
86. The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 614 (1924).




little litigation defining the standard of seamanship required,
several cases have indicated that a seaman who has been neg-
ligent in his duties is nevertheless reasonably fit.88 However, it
seems that since a seaman has been considered as an appurte-
nance, and since the enunciated test requires him to be as rea-
sonably fit as the ordinary man in the calling, there appears
no reason why the seaman should not be required to be equal
in ability to the ordinary seaman."9 Likewise it would seem that
a seaman's physical condition must be reasonably fit. Thus, a
seaman who has a venereal disease creates an unreasonable risk
and is unseaworthy, 0 whereas one who merely has some type
of contact dermatitis is not.9 1
Transitory unseaworthiness. In an attempt to temper the
obligation incumbent on a shipowner under the doctrine of un-
seaworthiness, several courts have found that where an unsea-
worthy condition is only temporary, 92 or arises instantaneously,9 3
or arises after the vessel "breaks ground, '94 the owner will be
liable for indemnification only if negligence on his part can be
shown. It has been said in these situations that the owner must
have had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition and
an opportunity to remedy it in order for there to be recovery.
The incorrectness of these holdings was indicated recently by
the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, IncY5 Since the
duty of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute,
he will be liable for injury regardless of his personal fault. Thus
knowledge of the owner or his ability to remedy the unseaworthy
condition are irrelevant in determining his liability,96 the only
requisite of the duty being that the unseaworthy condition exist
at the instant of injury.
88. Arena v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 895 (1960) ; Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956); Larsson v. Coastwise Line, 181 F.2d 6 (9th Cir..
1950).
89. Thus, seemingly if a seaman were grossly negligent, he might be consid-
ered unfit. Also, if a seaman with little experience and ability were ordered to
operate dangerous and complex machinery, he would be unfit and unseaworthy for
his intended purpose.
90. Flynn v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
91. Peterson v. United States, 224 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1955).
92. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1959); Cooking-
ham v. United States, 184 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950).
93. Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 434 (D. Mass. 1958).
94. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Dixon v.
United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955).
95. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
96. See Alper, The Maritime Definition of an Unsafe Place to Work, 14 MIAMI
L. REV. 22 (1959).
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* Still remaining after the Mitchell decision is the question of
when will a transitory condition constitute unseaworthiness. If
the transitory condition is a defect or dangerous situation in the
appurtenance itself, the only necessary determination to be made
is whether it is reasonably fit for its intended use. However, in
the factual situation where an appurtenance or the hull of the
vessel is inherently fit, but has a foreign substance on it,9 7 as
for example a deck or stairway is coated with water or oil, there
would seem to be two possible methods of analysis. The first is
to consider the appurtenance or the vessel and the foreign sub-
stance as separate and distinct entities. If the appurtenance or
vessel is found to be reasonably fit, then in order to obtain re-
covery it must be shown that the foreign substance is an ap-
purtenance of the vessel and that it is not reasonably fit. If it
is found that the foreign substance is not an appurtenance, the
analysis need be carried no further.98 Although the validity of
97. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) ; Blier v. United
States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Grzybowski v. Arrow Barge Co.,
283 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Puerto Seguro Cia. Naviera, S.A. v. Pitsillos, 279
F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Morales v. City of Galveston, 275 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1960), judgment vacated and remanded per curiam, 364 U.S. 295 (1960) ; Pierce
v. Erie R.R. Co., 264 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Yanow v. Weyerhaeuser Steam-
ship Co., 250 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Harrison, 245 F.2d 911(9th Cir. 1957) ; Johnson Line v. Maloney, 243 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Pacific
Far East Lines v. Williams, 234 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Troupe v. Chicago,
Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Co., 234 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Poignant v.
United States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Cookingham v. United States, 184
F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Marsh v. United Fruit Co., 190 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Colon v. Trinidad Corp., 188 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Firipis v.
The S/S Margaritis, 181 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Va. 1960) ; Hernandez v. The S.S.
Nancy Lykes, 175 F. Supp. 829 (D. Puerto Rico 1959) ; Santamaria v. The S.S.
Othem, 170 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. N.Y. 1959) ; Sloan v. The S.S. Alcoa Pennant,
168 F. Supp. 571 (S.D. Ala. 1958) ; Vastano v. The Partownership Brovigtank,
158 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. N.Y. 1957); Borgersen v. Skibs, A/S Abu, 156 F. Supp.
282 (E.D. N.Y. 1957) ; Spero v. Steamship The Argodon, 150 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
Va. 1957) ; Oakes v. Graham Towing Co., 135 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ;
McDonald v. Dingwall Shipping Co., 135 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1954) ; Garrison
v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; Daniels v. Pacific-Atlantic
S.S. Co., 120 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. N.Y. 1954) ; Shannon v. Union Barge Line Corp.,
100 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Pa. 1951) ; Holliday v. Pacific Atlantic S.S. Co., 99 F.
Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1951) ; Adamowski v. Gulf Oil Corp., 93 F. Supp. 115 (E.D.
Pa. 1950) ; Blodow v. Pan Pacific Fisheries, 275 P.2d 795 (Cal. App. 1954);
Gladstone v. Matson Nay. Co., 269 P.2d 37 (Cal. App. 1954) ; Ruffin v. United
States Lines Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1955) ; Guthrie v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
320 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
98. The following cases seemed to utilize this method of analysis: McDonald
v. Dingwall Shipping Co., 135 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1954) ; Gutherie v. Sin-
clair Refining Co., 320 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). If it is said that any
object aboard the vessel is to be considered an appurtenance, then seemingly it
would make no difference whether the appurtenance and the foreign substance
are considered as separate entities or not. However, if the proper test is that
the object must be one which is used in aid of the operation of the vessel, then
such a determination is critical. Under this approach, it would seem that the
separate entity approach is the most logical. For, although the distinction is not
so great where a mere spot of grease is on a deck, if a large tree branch were to
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this approach has never been before the Supreme Court directly,
the tenor of its decision in Mitchell indicates disapproval. The
second approach in analyzing this type of transitory unsea-
worthiness case is to treat the appurtenance and foreign sub-
stance as an entity. The inquiry is then limited to whether the
condition- the stairway coated with oil- amounts to an un-
seaworthy condition. Proof that the foreign substance was
present and was a cause in fact of the seaman's injury is not
sufficient to support recovery.9 It must be affirmatively estab-
lished that the appurtenance with the foreign substance on it is
not reasonably fit. Thus, recovery has been allowed where an
icy and oily condition existed on a deck'0° or where there was a
dangerous accumulation of grease on a ladder, 10 but has been
denied where there was only a puddle of rain water on the
deck.10 2
Reasonable fitness and cause in fact. There is a series of
decisions holding that if the negligence of a third person or the
injured party himself caused an unseaworthy condition the ship-
owner will not be liable under the doctrine of unseaworthiness. 1 8
These decisions have been subject to criticism by many courts, 0 4
and have been overruled, at least in dictum, by the Supreme
Court. 1 It would seem that the better rule is that the ship-
fall onto the ship's deck it would be somewhat anomalous to consider the branch
and the deck as one object. However, if an object need only be on board for it
to be classified as an appurtenance, the use of the separate entity approach would
make it difficult to ascertain what the intended use of the tree branch was.
99. Blier v. United States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Pierce v.
Erie R.R., 264 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d
595 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Colon v. Trinidad Corp., 188 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ;
Firipis v. The S/S Margaritis, 181 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Va. 1960) ; Santamaria v.
The S.S. Othem, 170 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. N.Y. 1959).
100. Vastano v. Partownership Brovigtank, 158 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. N.Y.
1957).
101. Oakes v. Graham Towing Co., 135 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
102. Garrison v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
103. Blankenship v. Ellerman's Wilson Line New York, Inc., 265 F.2d 455
(4th Cir. 1959) ; Penedo Cia Naviera S.A. v. Maniatis, 262 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.
1959) ; Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Billeci v. United
States, 185 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1960) ; Harrell v. Lykes Brothers S.S. Co.,
165 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958).
104. Rich v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 278 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1960);
Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Thurston v. United States,
179 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Oddenes v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 188 F.
Supp. 117 (S.D. N.Y. 1960); Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp.
212 (E.D. Va. 1960); Robillard v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 186 F. Supp. 193
(S.D. N.Y. 1960); DiSalvo v. Cunard Steamship Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. N.Y.
1959) ; Silk v. United States War Shipping Administration, 79 F. Supp. 579
(E.D. Pa. 1948).
105. Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 427 (1959) : "And to ap-
pliances the duty of the shipowner does not end with supplying them; he must
keep them in order. . . . The shipowner is not relieved of these responsibilities
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owner remains liable even though the negligence of a third
person or of the injured party himself creates the unseaworthy
condition. Under the traditional reasonable fitness analysis,
this would seem a sound position, since the general rule fixes
liability if there is a finding that the offending appurtenance
was not reaosnably fit and caused injury. Whether the unfit
condition was caused by the shipowner, the injured party, a
third person, or an Act of God would seem to be of no conse-
quence.
Negligent Use of Seaworthy Equipment
Most courts are in accord in holding that where injury is
caused solely by the negligent use of reasonably fit equipment
there is no liability under the doctrine of unseaworthiness.' 0 0
Thus, if a winch operator fails to observe the approach of a
seaman and negligently lowers a boom on him there is no lia-
bility if the winch, boom, and operator are in all respects sea-
worthy 0 7 If the appurtenances are in fact found to be reason-
ably fit, the standard of excellence required by the duty has
been satisfied, and there is no unseaworthiness to cause injury.
However, in many instances the distinction between an unsea-
worthy condition created by negligence and a dangerous condi-
tion created by the negligent use of seaworthy equipment is a
fine one. Thus, where a seaworthy appliance is equipped with
a safety device which is not used, it is difficult to determine
into which category the situation falls. Several courts have held
by turning control of the loading or unloading of the ship over to a stevedoring
company. It was held in Grillea v. United States ... that stevedores themselves
could render a ship pro tanto unseaworthy and make the vessel owner liable for
injuries to one of them."
106. Oblatore v. United States, 289 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Williams v.
The S.S. Richard de Larrinaga, 287 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Arena v. Lucken-
bach Steamship Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960) ;
Royal Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Peck, 269 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Penedo Cia
Naviera S.A. v. Maniatis, 262 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1959); Donovan v. Esso
Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959);
Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
941 (1956) ; Manhat v. United States, 220 F.2d 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 966 (1955) ; Freitas v. Pacific-Atlantic Steamship Co., 218 F.2d 562 (9th
Cir. 1955) ; Berti v. Compagnie de Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397 (2d
Cir. 1954) ; Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 773 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855 (1954) ; Larsson v. Coastwise Line, 181 F.2d 6
(9th Cir. 1950) ; Knox v. United States Lines Co., 186 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. Pa.
1960); Green v. Skibs A/S Mandeville, 186 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. S.C. 1960);
Billeci v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1960) ; Lewis v. Maritime
Overseas Corp., 163 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1958) ; Shelton v. Seas Shipping Co.,
75 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
107. Arena v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 279 F.2d 286, 189 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960).
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that the failure to employ available safety devices amounts to
negligent use of seaworthy equipment.10 8 However, it would
seem equally sound to reason that whether there is a failure to
furnish the safety device - in which event the situation would
clearly fit under the unseaworthy appurtenance category- or
a failure to use a safety device does not alter the actual existence
of a dangerous condition. All that is necessary for liability is
that the appurtenance be unfit at the time of injury.
What Is the Intended Use?
The concept of intended use could possibly be referred to as
an affirmative defense to unseaworthiness. Thus, even though
an appurtenance is found in fact to be unreasonably fit, an
owner'°9 may not be liable, since he is only required to warrant
the seaworthiness of his equipment for a suitable, intended
use.
110
It is unclear exactly how the use intended by the owner may
be determined. Perhaps it is the initial use to which the ap-
purtenance is put. However, the initial use would seem to be
capable of change by those in positions of authority aboard the
vessel and be still attributable to the owner. 1 It would also
seem equally possible to hold that if an officer directed that an
appurtenance be used in a manner clearly not contemplated by
the owner, or for which it was obviously not suitable, the owner
might not be held liable. It is at least clear that an individual
seaman, without authority, cannot alter or change the use in-
tended by the owner and still obtain recovery.
1 2
If an owner intends to use an appurtenance for a purpose
for which it is not reasonably suitable, he will be liable. Even
if a seaman uses an appurtenance in a manner not intended by
108. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855 (1954); Billeci v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 711
(N.D. Cal. 1960); Borgersen v. Skibs, A/S Abu, 156 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. N.Y.
1957); Henry v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 134 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
109. From the cases it would seem that it is the intended use of the owner
that is controlling. The use intended by the manufacturer has not been considered.
A possible interpretation is that the intended use is that to which the ap-
purtenance is actually put. However, to adopt this position would be to emasculate
the meaning of the word's intended use, since any use would be the intended use.
110. Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines, 254 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 818 (1958) ; Sulsenti v. Cadogan S.S. Co., 54 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
111. Thus, as in the Mahnich decision, where the initial use of the rope was in
connection with a Lyle gun, that use could be changed if a master, mate, or
boatswain used it to rig a staging. See also Wyborski v. Bristol City Line of
Steamships, Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1961).
112. See cases cited in note 110 supra.
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the owner, but for which it is still suitable, seemingly there
would be no liability because the appurtenance is reasonably fit.
But if that seaman uses it for a purpose for which it is neither
suitable nor intended, there is no liability.1 3 This is true even
though the condition created by the seaman constitutes an un-
reasonable risk. Thus, if the shipowner provides platforms for
protecting a wooden deck during loading operations, and they
are used as windbreaks, the vessel is not unseaworthy.1 4 If an
owner supplies battens for cargo, he is not liable if they are
used as ladders." 5 It would seem, though, that the fact that an
appurtenance has been put to an unintended use should defeat
liability only where the vessel is also equipped with the proper
equipment for the performance of that task. If no appropriate
equipment is aboard, then the vessel is unseaworthy under the
theory that the shipowner has failed to furnish a necessary ap-
purtenance, and the fact that another appurtenance was used in
an unintended manner in an attempt to accomplish the task
seems irrelevant." 6
Under the section on reasonable fitness and cause in fact it
was indicated that a majority of cases hold that it is no defense
that an unseaworthy condition is created by the negligence of a
third person or by the injured party himself. There appears,
however, to be the possibility of a defense in this situation under
the intended use analysis. The argument would be that although
the appurtenance in such a case is being used for its intended
purpose, it is not being used in its intended manner. Such a
defense would present a more clearly drawn policy determina-
tion for the court - whether the shipowner's duty to provide a
reasonably fit vessel is designed to protect against the risk of
injury caused by the use of an appurtenance in a manner not
intended by the owner. At least one case has held that the duty
does not extend this far, holding that a seaman who used a sea-
113. See cases cited in note 110 supra.
114. Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines, 254 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 818 (1958).
115. Sulsenti v. Cadogan S.S. Co., 54 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
116. The following example demonstrates these concepts. A tug is contracted
to pull a tow. There are two ropes aboard the tug: One is a sound seven-inch
hawser which is designed and intended to be used in pulling tugs and the other
is a one-half inch line used to hoist the tug's flag. If the hawser were used, the
tow could be pulled in safety. But if the seaman selects the one-half inch line to
pull a tow, a purpose for which it is clearly not designed nor intended, then
seemingly there is no liability on the part of the vessel owner. However, if the
vessel were furnished only with the smaller line, it is clear the vessel is unsea-
worthy because it would not be reasonably fit to pull the tow. See Arena v.




worthy ladder in such an unintended manner as to create an
unseaworthy condition could not recover from the owner under
the unseaworthiness doctrine.117 With such an analysis it would
seem that the use of an appurtenance without its furnished
safety device is also a use in a manner not intended so as to
preclude recovery.
Very often a determination of what is reasonable fitness is
controlled by what is the intended use. A vessel may be prop-
erly equipped for one type of service and, yet, be unseaworthy
for others. Thus, it has been stated that a vessel without a
railing is unseaworthy for performing activities on the open sea,
but is reasonably fit for performing tasks on the quiet waters
of a harbor."18 Likewise it has been held that a qualified person
directed to repair an unseaworthy condition cannot recover for
injuries caused by that condition. 119 This rule seems in accord
with a basic policy consideration underlying the unseaworthiness
doctrine - that the ordinary seaman is unable to appraise prop-
erly the dangers incident to the complex equipment of a modern
vessel.' 2° Where the danger has been pointed out to a seaman
who is qualified to repair it, the reason for holding the owner
to the rigid requirements of the doctrine disappears.12' The rule
that a qualified repairer cannot rely on the unseaworthiness doc-
trine is also sound from the standpoint of the logic of the in-
tended use analysis. When an appurtenance is broken or unfit
and the shipowner seeks to have it repaired, the intended use
of the appliance has changed. The new intended use is repair.
117. In Bishop v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. N.Y. 1958), a sea-
man was attempting to remove a frozen plug from an overhead drain pipe. In
order to reach the plug he secured an "A" frame-type ladder. However, instead
of opening it he rested it against a blower or motor in its closed position. The
court found that the ladder was in all respects seaworthy. In non-suiting the
libellant the court made the following observation: "It is evident from the proof
that the libelant did not use this "A" type ladder in a proper manner. It was his
duty to open the ladder into an "A" position, the manner in which it was intended
to be used." Id. at 275.
118. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIEs 73, and cases cited in nn. 15, 16,
17 (1959).
119. Bruszewski v. Isthmian B.S. Co., 163 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Byars
v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 155 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Pinion v. Mississippi
Shipping Co., 156 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1957). It could not be here said that
the doctrine of assumption of risk applies to preclude the repairman from recovery
because seemingly that doctrine does not apply in admiralty. See NORRaS, MAaI-
TIME PERSONAL INJURIES 97-103 (1959).
120. See The State of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944, 945 (4th Cir. 1936).
121. However, possibly a contrary decision might be reached if an inexperienced
person were directed to remedy an unseaworthy condition in complex equipment.
The lack of knowledge, inexperience, and inability to cope adequately with the
dangerous condition on the part of the seaman would seem to involve an unrea-
sonable risk, even though he were aware of the danger.
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This reasoning would also seem applicable in the situation
where an unseaworthy appliance is sought to be removed from
the reach of the crew. Under the reasonable fitness approach
alone, it would seem that the attempted isolation of the ap-
purtenance would not preclude recovery. However, a better ap-
proach would appear to be that the intended use of the appliance
has become non-use. A defense should be available to the owner
in this situation. For example, suppose that a ship's ladder was
damaged during unloading operations. The owner became aware
of the situation and warned the seamen of the condition and
posted guards and warning signs around it. Nevertheless, a
seaman attempted to use the ladder and was injured. That the
ladder was unseaworthy to use for ascending and descending
between decks is apparent. But, it would seem that the actions
on the part of the shipowner of prohibiting the ordinary use of
the appurtenance manifests an intention to relegate it to a status
of non-use. The remaining inquiry would thus be what is rea-
sonable fitness during non-use. Seemingly a ladder in the con-
dition above described would not constitute an unreasonable risk.
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The doctrine of comparative negligence'2 was first applied
in admiralty to mitigate damages in collision cases, 1m and was
later extended to the field of maritime personal injuries in The
Max Morris2 4 decided in 1890. During the period -when re-
covery for unseaworthiness was allowed only if the personal
fault of the shipowner could be shown, the corollary doctrine
of comparative negligence was theoretically harmonious. How-
ever, this harmony was seemingly destroyed with the develop-
ment of the modern unseaworthiness, since comparative negli-
gence would seem to have no application to an absolute liability
situation.125
122. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, there can be no recovery
if the plaintiff's own negligence or substandard conduct contributes factually to
his own injury. PROssER, TORTS 283 (2d ed. 1955). There was dissatisfaction
with this rule, since even though the defendant's negligence was gross and plain-
tiff's slight, very often the plaintiff would be precluded from recovery because of
his contributory negligence. The doctrine of comparative negligence arose as an
attempt to mitigate the hardships caused by the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. Under this doctrine the fault of the plaintiff is compared to the fault of
the defendant, and the amount of damages reduced proportionately. Id. at 296.
123. Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 15 (1928).
124. 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
125. By definition, comparative negligence means a comparing or proportioning
of the degrees of fault of the parties litigant. However, absolute liability connotes
an absence of personal fault consideration. To allow comparative negligence to be
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The only Supreme Court case which seems to mention com-
parative negligence with respect to the modern doctrine of un-
seaworthiness is Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn.1 26 However, the
lower federal courts have consistently employed the doctrine to
mitigate damages, 127 presumably either because the theoretical
inconsistency has never been squarely presented to them, or be-
cause in certain cases the inclination is to shift the burden of
loss away from the shipowner. The courts might well feel that
where a seaman caused his own injury, he should partially bear
the burden of that loss as an added incentive to preserve his own
personal safety.
Regardless of why, the doctrine of comparative negligence
appears to be firmly entrenched. Rather than compare the de-
grees of negligence of the parties litigant, the courts compare
the absolute liability of the defendant with the degree or magni-
tude of fault of the plaintiff. This is very analogous to the
doctrine of "comparative causation" that prevails in French
automobile tort law. 28 What such a determination amounts to
is that if the appurtenance is not reasonably fit the shipowner
will have to fully indemnify unless he can show some degree of
fault on the part of the injured plaintiff.
An interesting problem is to what extent an injured sea-
man's damages should be reduced when his own negligence is
the sole cause of an unseaworthy condition. One court has in-
used to mitigate damages would be to reintroduce fault as a concept into the
theory of absolute liability. This is contrary to the basic policy consideration
supporting strict liability, i.e., the burden of risk or loss is best shifted onto the
industry or onto society as a whole.
126. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
127. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Donovan v. Esso
Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959);
Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Ross v. Steamship
Zeeland, 240 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1957) ; Pedersen v. United States, 224 F.2d 212
(2d Cir. 1955); Bentley v. Albatross S.S. Co., 203 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1953);
Kulukundis v. Strand, 202 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1953); Read v. United States,
201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Thurston v. United States, 179 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.
1950) ; Merrill v. The S.S. Cuaco, 189 F. Supp. 321 (D. Ore. 1960) ; Cooper v.
D/A/S Progress, 188 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1960) ; Oddenes v. Universe Tank-
ships, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. N.Y. 1960) ; Walsh v. Boston Sand & Gravel
Co., 175 F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass. 1959) ; Bradshaw v. The Carol Ann, 163 F.
Supp. 366 (S.D. Tex. 1956); Efstratios Karanikolas v. Navegacion Maritime
Pan., 157 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. N.Y. 1958); Stendze v. The Boat Neptune, 135
F. Supp. 801 (D. Mass 1955) ; Mormino v. Leon Hess, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 314(S.D. N.Y. 1953) ; Haywood v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 108 F. Supp. 661
(W.D. Pa. 1952); McLeod v. Union Barge Line Co., 95 F. Supp. 366 (W.D.
Pa. 1951) ; Lawrenson v. Chas. Curz & Co., 91 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1950);
Stokes v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. N.Y. 1944).
128. Veuve Abela c. Laiterie cooperative de Saint-Andr6-de-l'Eure, 27 Oct.
1948, S. 1949.1.119. See Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of
Workmen's Compensation, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 231, 245 (1952).
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dicated that in this situation by virtue of comparative negligence
there can be no recovery. 1 29 Another indicated under similar
circumstances that the seaman's recovery should be reduced
fifty per cent.130 Such determinations point to a problem in-
herent in all comparative negligence decisions, i.e., what per-
centage reduction should be assigned to any particular degree
or magnitude of fault.
CONCLUSION
Under the modern doctrine of unseaworthiness seamen are
given a more advantageous action for indemnity for injury than
is afforded passengers and shoreside workers.181 This cause of
action has become firmly entrenched in the law. But like any
other form of judge-made law, it has had to evolve and develop
decision by decision. The resolution of old problems has created
new ones. It is hoped that this Comment will focus attention on
some of these problems and furnish an analytical process for
reaching logical and consistent solutions.
Walter I. Lanier, Jr.
Inter-Sovereign Certification as an Answer to the
Abstention Problem
Under the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' when jurisdic-
tion is predicated upon diversity of citizenship, federal courts
are required to apply state law. In general, the necessary de-
termination of applicable state law will be made by the federal
court itself, with recourse to such sources as are available. How-
ever, in a significant area of cases, the doctrine of "equitable
abstention" has been applied,2 whereby a federal action will be
129. Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 907 (1959).
130. Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960).
131. For this reason the Supreme Court has been severely criticized in some
circles. See Boner, One If By Land, Two If By Sea: A Comparative Study of
Remedies Available to Injured Seamen and Land Workers, 30 TEXAS L. REV.
489 (1952) ; The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Rersonal Injury Remedies,
57 YALE L.J. 243 (1947); Lovitt, Things Are Seldom What They Seem: The
Jolly Little Wards of the Admiralty, 46 A.B.A.J. 171 (1960).
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. The case generally cited as establishing the abstention doctrine is Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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